This article surveys the degree of central bank independence in Norway between 1945 and 1970. By comparing the developments in Norway with those of Sweden and the United Kingdom, it is shown that the Norwegian central bank had less room for maneuver than in the other countries. In spite of a high legal independence, the actual performance of central bank operations was almost completely subordinated the instructions given by the Ministry of Finance. A particular vivid, dirigiste environment followed the experiences of the 1930s and the war in Norway, curtailing any effort to make the central bank an independent institution in the machinery of state economic management that followed the return to peace. JEL-codes: E58, F33, N44.
Introduction
Over the past decades, countries and regions around the globe have adopted reforms aimed at making their central banks more independent from government influences. Since the Reserve Bank in New Zealand implemented its price stability act in 1988, inflation targeting have become a widely accepted commitment device for most central bankers. The bulk of academic research has also supported this move by emphasizing the felicitous effects of central bank independence (CBI) on price stability and domestic economic output. 1 The contrast of this recent state of affairs with practice and consensus in the first quarter after the Second World War period is well-known. Many central banks functioned, as Alex Cukierman has stated, 'as departments of ministries of finance.' They were expected, by law, custom or policy instruction, to utilize their instruments to achieve a myriad of government objectives, ranging from full employment to stability in prices and exchange rates. Cooperation Council (JCC) in 1951, as bold attempts by governor Jahn to obtain key positions in currency policy and domestic credit regulation, as Ecklund tends to do, is to exaggerate the Bank's achievements during the period. Rather, the proposal of a JCC was an 'exit-solution' to avoid the Bank turning out to be a cashier's office in the Ministry and to gain at least some influence in directing private banks. Similarly, the real power of the FEC was rather bleak. Also in this policy area it was the Ministry which had the last word.
Accordingly, the institutional setting when Erik Brofoss entered the scene in 1954 was not one of a powerful BoN sparring with Ministry officials and actively participating in policy formulation and implementation. More truly, it was a central bank without much operational power left. Within these limits, the Bank was assigned some real influence in exchange rate policies (implementing currency regulations and managing reserves) and moral suasion (negotiating lending arrangements with the private banks under directions of the JCC). In most other policy areas, whether it came to determination of interest rates or targeting monetary objectives, the Bank's role was at best that of consulting and advising.
As a prominent member of the ruling Labor party, and former minister of both finance and trade, Erik Brofoss accepted the political subordination of the Bank and supported the establishments of corporate arrangements such as the JCC. The Bank he inherited was in such manner well suited to both his personality and political beliefs. By virtue of the Bank's expertise in monetary matters, and his broad platform of connections, Brofoss also managed to solidify the position of the JCC and to integrate it more closely to the economic policy making process. Additionally, in some fields not regarded to be core functions of a central bank, for instance industrial and regional policies, Brofoss created a new role for the Bank.
Within these political boundaries, he followed his predecessors' style and opposed authorities publicly whenever it felt required. It was a central banks' most important task, he once expressed in the words of Montagu Norman, to defend its position 'up to the point of nagging'. 5 But with the introduction of the Credit Law in 1965, which statute most former monetary policy provisions under government jurisdiction and abolished corporate arrangements as the JCC, many of Brofoss' achievements lost ground. To the governor's great disappointment, the BoN was reduced to be the henchman in exertion of government policy in most areas.
There are many similarities in the the evolvement of central banking in Norway, Sweden and the UK. In all countries the central banks were rather marginalized in the immediate postwar period, reflecting the abundance of money in circulation and policy regimes favoring direct government control of credit and prices. But in their efforts to climb along the independence scale in the following decades, the BoN lagged behind. This article will try to sort out why and how this happened. It is structured in two parts. First part is quite quantitative in character and presents the method used and the results achieved. By focusing on developing usable definitions, a simple model is constructed to identify the determinants of CBI and discussing the possible relationships between them. In difference to similar models constructed to research CBI today, it is important that the determinants are historical applicable on the specific period which is investigated and on the sample of countries which is selected. Based on the determinants given in the model, four sub indexes embracing a total of 15 variables are presented. The multiple choices under each variable are structured from most weighty (high CBI) to less weighty (low CBI). Each country's position is placed in relationship to these choices. This enabled us to present quantitative judgments of the CBI for the nations involved. Some methodological reservations against the approach are also given in the section.
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Next part is more qualitative in character and presents an analysis with an historical bent.
Each of the variables identified in the index construction is discussed and compared in relation to the historical context in each country. Inadequacies and problems connected to the outcome of the index series are identified and analyzed. This regards aspects as the deviations between legal and actual CBI, the influence of moral suasion on central banking, and the informal impact given by personal and cultural factors. The section ends with a comparative discussion.
Method and Results
Over fifty years ago, Oscar Morgenstern, one of the founders of game theory, warned against quantitative exercises ranging qualitative phenomena by weighting them by numbers. The possibility of random error would be overwhelming, making the factors involved to vary from one measurement to another. Additionally, the determination of appropriate weights given to the various variables would be more subject to individual preferences than to objective, scientific criteria. Creating index series based on adding the weights would bias the results even further.
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Still, such a method is applied in this article. Serious reservation against the approach must obviously be granted. Foremost, the weighting of the variables must be interpreted in a qualitative way, presented with a quantitative flowering. The definition of determinants, and the process of attaching variables to them, was not any straightforward process. Particularly, two problems acted to bias the statistical result. While a variable in one country could be regarded as legal aspects of independence, in others it was identified as political or institutional. The time-span of the research was also a problem. Some variables could change their position in course of the period. To keep the factors steady some subjective shortcuts had to be made. Additionally, in cases of uncertainty about the placement of the variables, Norway acted as the exemplar to follow for the other countries.
Presentation of results
In spite of the methodological deficiencies, the construction of the index series had a fairly broad empirical basis. The many variables put into work should be sufficient to smooth out the distortion of the statistical procedure. An overview of the overall result is given in figure   1 : falsifiable. But it points to some external factors at work which undermined the power of the central banks, quite independent of their de jure positions. An obvious explanation is that the dominant politico-economic climate suppressed discretionary moves by the central banks. Nor were they allowed to follow freely those (non-discretionary) 'rules' which were recorded in statutory law. Whatever much governors and management boards stressed for independence in the public and vis-à-vis political authorities, their efforts went largely out in vain. In fact, it seems like the more confrontational the lines of arguments were, the less authority did the central bank retain. The historical analysis sets out to elaborate this issue further.
Historical Analysis and Comparisons
Governments were to entry several of capitalism's inner sanctums during the 1950s and The Bank of England Act of 1946 was both an act of nationalization and an act giving legal supremacy of the Treasury over the Bank in matters of policy. The Act authors, Herbert
Brittain and Wilfrid Eady in the Finance Division of the Treasury, emphasised that changes in the bank rate could no longer take place without close consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Clause 4 (1), the so-called 'power of direction', further empowered the Treasury with legal authority to instruct the Bank (instruksjonsrett). Another important and even more controversial provision, the 'power of direction of banks' (clause 4 (3)), gave the government the necessary legal foundation to control bank credit, both in general and selective ways.
However, Lord Catto, succeeding Montagu Norman as governor in 1944, managed to obtain some important concessions in the exercise of these laws. The Treasury could not execute clause 4 (1) without prior consultation with the governor. As to clause 4 (3), the Bank managed to obtain a more general wording of the bill, ensuring that the established warpractice of implementing private banking regulations were shared among the two. But when it came to the appointment of composition of governing bodies, the supremacy of the Treasury was not questioned. The deputy governor and governor, the 12 Directors of the Bank and the management board (the Court), were all to be government appointments. The terms of office of the governor was set to five years, with possibility for re-election. 10 All in all, the subordinate de jure position of the BoE was extraordinarily strong compared to most other central banks in Europe and the Americas. But as we shall see, this was not the case when it came to the Bank's actual or de facto independence.
Independence in the UK
In his dispute with the Treasury, Lord Catto was well aware of one thing: if the Bank were to press its objections too far, the outcome could be that the Treasury itself took all the powers the Bank wanted to possess. 11 However, the general wording of clause 4 (3) gave some room for independent actions. The statutory law gave in fact no specific provision for as to who were to enforce the directives and confront private banks. Given the traditional strong role of the Bank towards financial institutions in the square mile (the City), the task of regulating private banking credit fell quite natural to already established custom. Several attempts by Treasury officials, the urgent need was to cut back government expenditure and to curtail the uncontrolled growth in capital spending by local authorities and nationalised industries.
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Only by such measures could a cheap money policy be pursued successfully. In spite of the legal subordination to the government contained in the 1946 Act, the practical implementation of monetary policy thus gave some worthwhile degree of independence and authority to the Some striking differences to the UK monetary policy system were apparent. The importance of sterling in international currency transactions and the significant role of the City in international finance, made domestic policies sensitive for cross-national movements of currency and capital. In Sweden and Norway, on the other hand, the rigid non-market approach rested on the existence of exchange and capital controls that financially isolated them from the outside world. While basically no functioning market for financial assets existed in either of the countries, the vitality of money and capital markets still prevailed in best vigour in London. Accordingly, the encompassing system of domestic credit regulations introduced in the Nordic countries was protected and supported by the exchange and capital controls allowed for under the Bretton Woods system. It gave political authorities the power to establish a structure of interest rates and a distribution of credit that was 'regulated' by plan, not price.
In Sweden, the role of administering the system fell on the central bank. In fact, the architect behind the whole arrangement of regulation and control was Mats Lemne, the deputy governor in the Bank under Klas Böök, who succeeded Ivar Rooth in 1948. As a prominent member of the social democratic party and former state secretary in the Finance Ministry, Lemne was trusted the task of reforming the system. The immediate challenge was to reconcile the policy of selective allocations of credit with the objective of keeping interest rates low. The answer Lemne gave to the challenge was two-sided. At one front private banks supply of credit should be curtailed by lending arrangements and so-called liquidity quotas.
While a traditional deposit reserve requirement demanded the banks to keep part of their deposits with the central bank so as to keep liquidity and lending abilities under control, the liquidity quota plainly stated that a certain proportion of the reserve requirement should be met by buying government and housing bonds. In one go one thereby created a 'market' for public bonds without adding to total demand of credit and pushing interest rates upwards. At the other front were direct regulations of the bond market. No one could longer issue bonds without permission from the central bank. The size and interest rates of every 'market paper' had also to be approved. Thus, by rigid regulations of both the money and capital markets, total credit supply could be politically targeted and directed towards those areas of demand where policymakers had set priority without fear of rising interest rates.
In 
Politically determined interest rate in Norway
In Norway, the situation was quite another. Any change in the discount rate was not for the The statutory basis of the instrument also appealed to economists in search for efficient instruments to control private bank activities. But Jahns' references to the US system, and market-oriented policies more generally, surely also provoked. Olav Meisdalshagen, the finance minister, was not impressed. The proposal totally ignored the most pressing problem of the day: how to finance a growing state bank sector and obtain selective allocations of credits without adding to interest rates pressures. Quite contrary, when taking into account the large amount of government bonds that needed sale to arrange such financing, an exclusive reliance on traditional deposit reserve requirement in monetary policies would only push for open market operations and higher yields on bonds (higher interest rates).
In the bill put forward by the Ministry in November 1950, the role model of the deposit requirements had also taken an abrupt change, from the US to Sweden. Similar to Mats
Lemne's proposal for liquidity quotas, the Norwegian Ministry now suggested that the banks could meet the reserve requirements by keeping government securities and government- Obviously, such measures were incompatible with Labour's economic and political goals.
Furthermore, the planning or Frischian economists, who dominated the bureaucracy of the Ministry, did not have much affection for a JCC that formalized cooperation without support of statutory provisions. Instructions were in principle preferable to negotiations. But as long as the JCC managed to curtail private bank lending in accordance with the private credit targets declared in the national budgets, the corporate arrangement did serve an important purpose. After all, somewhere the private banks had to put idle deposits and various cash items, and governments bonds gave at least some yield to their buyers.
In February 1952, the parliament passed a redesigned bill on the deposit reserve requirements.
The Bank achieved a more pronounced position than in the original version, and the idea of using the reserve requirements to fund state-owned banks was annulled. However, the new In difference to Norway, the institutional framework for formulation and implementation of monetary policy was rather simple in Sweden. The Bank was in charge for both formulating statutory provisions and implementing them through moral suasion. In the monthly meetings with the financial institutions a broad range of aspect were negotiated: reserve requirements, consigned, from the point of view of the Radcliffe Committee, a wrong focus of attention and was a hindrance for developing a structured economic and statistical service that was a prime requirement for a modern central bank. The Committee sought therefore to strengthen the administration of the Bank simultaneously as it became a typical arm of government. The point was to obtain an unconditional capitulation on behalf of the Bank's independence and to subordinate it to the Treasury and to the overall aims of discretionary management. This would enable the Treasury to use the service of the Bank more thoroughly and to involve it more closely in its own macroeconomic deliberations.
To some extent these targets were reached during the 1960s. The Bank started to participate in budget discussion and was more closely involved in preparation of official national income forecasts. In the field of balance of payments estimations, the Bank was already participating, but mainly because it produced much of the statistical information. Now it was brought in to the inner circles of government policy making, undoubtedly enhancing the role and prestige of the Bank. But did this come at the cost of a loss of the Bank's independence? Looking at the City-Bank-Government relations, there are reasons to doubt so. Even if Governor O'Brien not publicly objected direct Government-City contact, in practice there was not much of it.
When Chancellor Denis Healy in the mid-1970s argued for closer contact with the financial institutions in the City, he at first had to break in some doors: 'Before I became Chancellor the the system of moral suasion in the UK in this way changed gravity, the special position and authority of the Bank gave it a status along the independence scale which was far out of reach for the central banks in Norway and Sweden.
Conclusions
The In both of the Scandinavian cases, the central banks tried to recapture some of its lost power and influence. But the Swedish Bank succeeded in a larger scale than was the case in Norway.
Gunnar Jahn's opposition may have stressed the Bank's independence towards the government too far, with the consequence that its most important policy instruments were deprived. In fact, during Brofoss' time as governor, moral suasion was the only effective instrument the Bank possessed. With the Credit law in 1965, also this tool came under
